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1SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
Respondent submits this supplemental brief pursuant
to Rule 25.5 of this Court.
Under the unique circumstances of this case, the brief
for the United States constitutes "intervening matter that
was not available in time to be included in a brief." A
majority of the government’s argument consists of an
attack on the literal reading of section 704(a) advanced 
respondent. 1 If this Court were to adopt the government’s
narrow reading of section 704(a), it is far from certain that
respondent would prevail. The original panel of the Sixth
Circuit that heard this case applied a version of the
"materially adverse" formulation now advanced by the
United States and concluded that the retaliation that
occurred in this case was lawful under section 704(a). (Pet.
App. 93a-103a). The interpretation of section 704(a)
proposed by the Solicitor General is different from that of
petitioner, and constitutes a candid repudiation of the
position heretofore taken by the EEOC. (U.S. Br. 15-16
n.4). The new matters raised by the government’s brief
could not have been addressed in the brief for respondent;
the two briefs were filed on the same day.
1 Compare R. Br. 8-28 with U.S. Br. 9-20.
2ARGUMENT
I. THE GOVERNMENT’S INTERPRETATION OF
SECTION 704(a) IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
TEXT AND PURPOSE OF THAT PROVISION
A substantial portion of the government’s argument is
devoted to three inter-related propositions: that section
704(a) forbids only the types of actions forbidden 
section 703, that section 703 is limited to discrimination in
the terms and conditions of employment, and that section
704(a) does not forbid retaliation outside the employer-
employee relationship. (U.S. Br. 9-20). These contentions
are squarely inconsistent with the position taken by the
United States in this Court in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
519 U.S. 337 (1997).
In Robinson, the court of appeals had held that section
704(a) does not forbid retaliation against former employ-
ees; the lower court reasoned that section 704(a) forbids
only the types of employment practices covered by section
703(a), and thus was limited to retaliation occurring when
the victim was still an employee. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
70 F.3d 325, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1995). 2 The United States,
urging this Court to reverse the decision of the circuit
It is unclear whether, or to what extent, the United States now
believes that Robinson should be overruled. In some passages, the
government asserts that section 704(a) does not apply to retaliation
"outside of the employment relationship." (U.S. Br. 19). That would
seem to mean that retaliation against a former employee - one who no
longer has such a relationship with the employer - would always be
lawful. Elsewhere, the United States states more ambiguously that the
retaliation need only be "employment-related conduct." (U.S. Br. 18).
That might apply to some types of retaliation against a former em-
ployee (e.g., if it prevented the victim from obtaining employment with
another employer) but not to others (e.g., a harassing lawsuit).
3court, correctly objected that this line of reasoning miscon-
strued the relationship between sections 704(a) and 703.
That analysis reflects a misunderstanding of Ti-
tle VII in several respects. It overlooks important
differences between Section 703 and Section 704
of Title VII. Section 703(a) declares it to be 
"unlawful employment practice" to violate Title
VII’s substantive prohibition against discrimina-
tion with respect to certain specified actions by
employers, all of which are related to employ-
ment. Section 704(a) provides that it shall also 
an "unlawful employment practice" to discrimi-
nate against a covered individual "because he
has made a charge" under Title VII. Violations of
Section 704(a) are not limited to the "unlawful
employment practice[s]" listed in Section 703(a).
Rather, Section 704(a) "speaks unconditionally,
without limitation to acts causing particular
harms .... " Smith v. Secretary of the Navy, 659
F.2d 113, 119 n.56 (D.C.Cir. 1981).3
The United States made the same point at oral argument.
"[Section] 704, unlike 703, doesn’t say discrimination in
the terms, conditions or privileges of employment. It just
says discrimination."~
The government does not explain how even its new
reading of the relationship between sections 704(a) and 703
3 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., No. 95-1376, Brief for the United States
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, 22-23 (footnote omitted). That footnote read 
part, "The unconditional nature of Section 704(a) reflects its broad
purpose of ensuring the effectiveness of the prohibitions on employment
discrimination." Id. at 23 n.12.
’ Transcript of Oral Argument, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 1996 WL
656475 *22.
4supports its suggestion that section 704(a) applies only 
retaliation constituting a "materially adverse employment
action." Even under section 703(a)(1) any work assignment,
employer-imposed working condition, or benefit is a "ter[m],
conditio[n] or privileg[e] of employment." The phrase
"materially adverse" is nowhere to be found in the gov-
ernment’s eleven page discussion of the connection be-
tween section 704(a) and 703. (U.S. Br. 9-20).
This phrase first makes its appearance at page 21 of
the brief for the United States. There the government
asserts (correctly in our view) that to establish a prima
facie case under section 704(a) a plaintiff must show that
he or she has suffered an "adverse employment action."5
The United States then observes that a number of courts
of appeals have "held that an employee must show a
materially adverse change in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment to satisfy the adverse action
element of the prima facie case." (U.S. Br. 21) (emphasis
added). This sentence is somewhat perplexing. The whole
thrust of the government’s brief is to urge this Court to
hold that the complained of retaliation cannot merely be
"adverse," it must be =materially adverse." (Although the
matter is not free from doubt, we take it that the govern-
ment uses the term "materially" in its ordinary meaning of
"to a significant extent or degree. ~) If ~materially adverse"
requires injury or change more serious than what is
That is consistent with our proposed literal reading of section
704(a), which requires discrimination "against" the plaintiff. That is the
meaning of "adverse" in ordinary English. Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary, 31 (1981) (defining "adverse" as "in opposition
to one’s interests," "unfavorable," "detrimental").
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1392 (1981).
5merely "adverse," it makes no sense to assert that only
proof of "materially adverse" action will "satisfy" the
requirement of "adverse" action.
This additional requirement of "material" adversity
would be unwarranted even in an action under section
703. Section 703(a)(2) forbids an employer, inter alia,
to limit ... his employees . .. in any way which
would ... adversely affect his status as an era-
ployee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (emphasis added). When 
gress chose to use the term "adverse" in Title VII, 7 it
emphatically did not include the additional requirement
that the discriminatory action be "materially" adverse.
That choice is assuredly a deliberate one; the term "ad-
verse" is used more than 1300 times in the United States
Code, but the more limited phrase "materially adverse" is
utilized in only seven federal statutes.8
The government acknowledges that its reading of
section 704(a) would in some circumstances permit 
employer to engage in retaliatory actions that "would
deter employees from charging discrimination." (U.S. Br.
19). On the government’s view, any objection that an
employer would thus be able - by using properly crafted
retaliatory techniques - to prevent workers from com-
plaining to the EEOC, testifying at trial, or objecting to
sexual harassment, is "tantamount to a policy objection to
7 The term adverse, not modified by ~materially," is also in section
703(c)(2).
8 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 702; 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843, 1844; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78q,
78eee; 16 U.S.C. § 6205.
6the line drawn by Congress." (U.S. Br. 20). But in its brief
in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the United States saw no
such line limiting the reach of the section 704(a) ban 
retaliation, which the Solicitor General correctly charac-
terized as "unconditional."
At a minimum the statute is ambiguous .... [I]n
construing a statute, the Court should adopt
that sense of its words which best promotes the
policy and objectives of the legislature. [King v.]
St. Vincent’s Hospital, [502 U.S. 215,] 221
[(1991)] .... Strong protection from retaliation
toward employees who complain to, or cooperate
with the EEOC is essential to the effectiveness of
Title VII .... 9
As the government correctly recognized in this earlier
brief, the policy of protecting employees from retaliation -
all retaliation - is the policy of the Congress itself.
II. THE GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSED INTER-
PRETATION OF SECTION 704(a) FAILS TO
PROVIDE A CLEAR AND PREDICTABLE
STANDARD FOR THE LOWER COURTS
The government suggests its proposed interpretation
of section 704(a) will provide the lower courts with 
workable, objective, and uniform standard." (U.S. Br. 20).
To the contrary, far from being workable, objective or
uniform, what the government proposes is hardly a stan-
dard at all.
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., No. 95-1376, Brief for the United States
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, 16.
7The government offers three quite different charac-
terizations of its proposal. First, it asserts that a plaintiff
must show that the retaliatory act resulted in a "materi-
ally significant disadvantage." (U.S. Br. 22). This seems
congruent with the phrase "materially adverse." Since
both "materially" and %ignificant" mean "important," this
formulation requires something like a very important
disadvantage. Paying someone less because she com-
plained about sexual harassment would be a disadvantage
(or adverse); a pay cut of $100 a week might be materially
adverse, but a smaller pay cut (say, $10) might not. 
retaliatory transfer to a more distant office might be
materially significant (at a distance of perhaps 50 miles),
materially adverse (perhaps 25 miles) or small enough 
be legal (possibly at 10 miles). To apply this type of stan-
dard, the lower courts would have to develop some sort of
rating system to evaluate the comparative disadvanta-
geousness of different acts of retaliation. How adverse a
retaliatory act is would at times depend on the circum-
stances of the employee. For example, ff an employer
transferred all women who complained about sexual
harassment at its Bethesda store to a store in Annapolis,
that would be materially (perhaps even materially signifi-
cantly) adverse for workers who lived in Bethesda, not at
all adverse for a worker who happened to live in Annapo-
lis, and only slightly adverse for a worker who lived in
between the two cities but closer to Bethesda.
That, however, is not the government’s only formula-
tion; indeed, it is not the formulation it proposes to use in
the instant case. Elsewhere in its brief, the United States
proposes that the legality of a retaliatory act should turn
on whether it constitutes a "significant change" in respon-
sibilities, working conditions or benefits. (U.S. Br. 21, 27,
828). Under this approach, it would not matter how adverse
the impact of that change was, so long as the change itself
was "significant." Thus if a supermarket retaliated against
a butcher by reassigning her to work as a cashier, there
would be an almost total change in responsibilities, but
the worker might find that change only slightly (or, per-
haps, not at all) disadvantageous. Application of this
approach would require the courts to develop a system for
rating the significance of changes in responsibilities (e.g.,
how much of the employee’s time was now devoted to
different tasks, and how different those tasks were),
working conditions (changes in location, hours, tempera-
ture), or benefits (alterations of wages, pension contribu-
tions, flex time). The government suggests that this
"significant change in responsibilities" test, not the "mate-
rially significant disadvantage" test, should be used here.
(U.S. Br. 27-28). Its proposed analysis turns solely on the
alteration in White’s work responsibilities, not on how
adverse those changes were for her.
Third, the government explains that the controlling
question is about the type of harm the employer caused.
Retaliation is materially adverse if it brings about "objec-
tively tangible harm," but not if it causes "[p]urely subjec-
tive injuries." (U.S. Br. 23). The meaning of this distinction
(and of this alternative explanation of "materially ad-
verse") is not entirely clear. The government may intend to
bar only claims based on purely idiosyncratic employee
preferences, such as a worker who claims he was retali-
ated against by being assigned to work in an office painted
yellow, his least favorite color. That would rule out rela-
tively few retaliation claims. On the other hand, perhaps
the government means that there must be an economic
harm, such as lost wages or medical expenses; that would
9exclude many of the cases for which Congress amended
Title VII to authorize awards of compensatory damages.
The United States does not ask this Court at this time
to decide among these (or possibly other) glosses on the
exceedingly malleable phrase "materially adverse." Nor
does the government suggest that the Court itself should
in this case begin to develop the appropriate rating scheme
(e.g., how far away can an employer transfer an employee
without that action causing a "materially significant
disadvantage" or constituting a "significant change?") All
this, and perhaps more, is to be left to the lower courts. "In
practice," the government surprisingly assures the Court,
"the results under the various formulations may not vary
greatly" from the EEOC "reasonably likely to deter"
standard. (U.S. Br. 16 n.9).
Three things about the government’s new position
are actually clear. First, that interpretation would mean
that there would be some forms of retaliation - serious
enough to deter protected activity - that would be lawful
under section 704(a). (In its briefs in the lower courts, 
Department of Justice, as counsel for federal defendants,
has identified a number of retaliatory practices which the
government suggests are per se lawful). 1° Second, that
interpretation would impose on the lower courts the
10 Brief of Appellee, McAdams v. Harvey, No. 04-16263-AA (llth
Cir.), 2005 WL 3147709 *5 ("a failure to receive a bonus ... does not
constitute a materially adverse action."); Brief of Appellee, Webster v.
Rumsfeld, No. 04-1739 (4th Cir.), 2005 WL 2044700 *24 ("the loss of 
bonus is not an adverse employment action where the employee is not
automatically entitled to a bonus."); Brief of Appellee, Smith v. Cohen,
No. 00-10199 (5th Cir.), 2000 WL 34214783 *36 (same); Brief 
Appellee, Groves v. Rubin, No. 00-12113GG (llth Cir.), 2000 
34020498 *22 (same).
10
unenviable and potentially endless task of deciding from
among an infinite variety of retaliatory tactics that are
to be declared permissible under the law. Third, that
interpretation cannot be reconciled with the language and
purpose of section 704(a).
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the decision of the Sixth Circuit
should be affirmed.
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